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Elimination of Automatic
Judgment Liens in Missouri
By William H. Henning

The traditional automatic
judgment lien on real
property following rendition
of a money judgment has
been statutorily eliminated.
Judgment liens are now
dependent upon the filing of
an abstract of the judgment

IT
HAS BECOME ALMOST AXIOMATIC to say that the money
judgment' of a Missouri court of record
is a lien on the judgment debtor's real
property located in the county in which
the court sits, but a recent enactment of
the Missouri legislature appears to have
abolished this automatic lien. 2 The new
legislation is, however, ambiguous in
several respects, and the purpose of this
article is to examine the act in an
attempt to resolve these ambiguities. In
the process, the article will also deal
with some other aspects of judgment
liens not specifically within the scope of
the new legislation.
In order to understand the new act it
is necessary to place it in a historical
context. Prior to the court reorganization that became effective January 2,
1979, Section 511.350, RSMo Supp.
1975, provided that judgments and decrees "rendered by the supreme court,
by any United States district or circuit
court held within this state, by any district of the court of appeals, and by any
court of record, except judgments and
decrees rendered by magistrate courts
..."1were liens on the judgment debt-

by the court clerk, but the
implementing legislation
contains ambiguities that
raise issues regarding the
scope of such liens.

or's real property "situate in the county
for which or in which the court is held." 3
Missouri courts of record were statutorily defined as the supreme court, the
courts of appeals, the circuit courts, the
magistrate courts, the probate courts
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and the courts of common pleas. 4 The judgment was rendered.1 ° However,
liens commenced on the day the judg- since probate courts were defined as
ment was rendered 5 and arose automati- courts of record but were not subject to
cally in that no further action by the transcripting requirements like those
courts or their clerks was necessary to imposed on the magistrate courts, their
their existence.
money judgments were automatic liens
except in those populous cities and
counties where courts of record were
Exceptions to the
subjected to the abstracting requirements set out in the preceding paraautomatic lien
graph. These liens created problems for
provisions
title attorneys in rural areas, but the
problems were minimal since the proThere were exceptions to the automa- bate courts rarely rendered money
tic lien provisions. For example, judg- judgments. "
ments rendered by courts in a city havEffective January 2, 1979, the court
ing over one hundred thousand inhabi- system in Missouri was restructured by
tants or in a county having over sixty revision of Article V of the Missouri
thousand inhabitants did not become Constitution and implementing legislaliens until an abstract of the judgment tion. As a result, the old inferior courts
was entered in a book kept by the clerk such as the magistrate courts, probate
of the circuit court having jurisdiction courts, courts of common pleas and
over civil actions in that city or county. 6 municipal corporation courts were abolThe clerks of the other courts of record ished as independent tribunals 12 and
within such a city or county were under their jurisdictions were transferred to
an affirmative duty to furnish an abstract the circuit courts, 13 which now have
ofjudgments rendered in their courts to jurisdiction over all civil and criminal
the circuit court clerk within five days matters. 14 Most of the jurisdiction of the
following rendition, and the circuit old magistrate courts was transferred to
court clerks were required to enter the associate circuit court judges, and pracabstracts at once.' In addition, the cir- tice and procedure in most cases heard
cuit court clerks were required to pre- in the new associate divisions is now
pare and enter abstracts of judgments of governed by the Court Reform and Retheir own courts within five days follow- vision Act of 1978, the relevant proviing rendition.' Finally, any party could sions of which are codified at Chapter
furnish an abstract to the circuit court
clerk, who was required to enter it
immediately. 9 This last technique could Most important aspect of
be utilized by attorneys who did not this procedure for
want to wait up to five days to have their
abstracts entered and as a vehicle to present purposes
create liens from federal district court
judgments in such cities or counties 517, RSMo 1978.15 The most important
since the affirmative duty to provide ab- aspect of this procedure for present purstracts did not extend to the clerks of poses is a transcripting requirement
federal courts.
similar to that applicable to the old
Another important exception to the magistrate courts. Sections 517.770 and
automatic judgment lien was a limita- 517.780, RSMo 1978, which have not
tion on the effect of magistrate court been revised by the recent legislation,
judgments, which did not become liens provide that every judgment of the
until a certified transcript of the judg- associate division in a case within the
ment was filed with the clerk of the cir- scope of Chapter 517 operates as a lien
cuit court of the county in which the on the real estate of the judgment debt194 -
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or from the time a certified transcript of
the judgment is filed with the clerk of
the circuit court of the county in which
the judgment is rendered. The transcripts are available upon demand
(there is no affirmative duty placed on
the clerks to prepare them as was the
case with abstracts of judgments rendered by courts of record in populous
cities and counties), and the clerk of the
circuit court is required to file the transcript, record it in a book to be kept for
that purpose, and enter it in his permanent record of circuit court judgments. 16 In other cases within the jurisdiction of the associate divisions buit outside the scope of Chapter 517,17 the
transcripting requirements are inapplicable and, prior to the new legislation,
apparently operated as automatic liens
except in areas where the courts were
subject to abstracting requirements. 18
The effect of the new act on such judgments is explored below.

Effect of new act on
such judgments
The court reorganization failed to resolve some problems for title attorneys
and created others. Since Chapter 517
does not apply to practice and procedure in the probate divisions,1 9 money
judgments rendered in such divisions
had the same effect as money judgments
in the old probate courts and were automatic liens except in populous cities and
counties. In addition, municipal courts
20
became divisions of the circuit court
and were, therefore, elevated to the status of courts of record, the definition of
which was revised by the Court Reform
and Revision Act of 1978 to include the
supreme court, courts of appeal and circuit courts.21 There was concern in the

real estate bar that ajudgment rendered
in the municipal division regarding such
a minor matter as a parking fine was
technically a lien on the defendant's real
estate and therefore operated as a cloud
on this title. 22 Coupled with the same
problem arising from money judgments

rendered in the probate divisions and in
the associate divisions in cases not governed by Chapter 517, there was a
potentially significant number of judgments operating as liens on real estate
and yet not subject to abstracting or
transcripting requirements.
The problem was compounded by the
fact that Supreme Court Administrative
Rule 4, which established a uniform record keeping system in the circuit
courts 23 and required the maintenance

of an alphabetical card file index of all
civil judgments, 24 has not been applied
to the divisions of the circuit courts.
Accordingly, it was virtually impossible
for title examiners in rural areas to find
all the judgments that might operate
as
5
automatic liens on real estate. 2
The new legislation enacted by the
Missouri General Assembly in 1982 is
designed to correct the deficiencies in
the present system by eliminating the
automatic judgment lien in all cases.
The act repeals existing Sections
511.350 and 511.500 and replaces them
with two new statutes bearing the same
numerical designation. New Section
511.350 contains three subsections, the
first of which states as follows:
"Judgments and decrees rendered by the
supreme court, by any United States district

or circuit court held within this state, by any
district of the court of appeals, by any circuit
court and any probate division of the circuit
court, except judgments and decrees rendered by associate, small claims and municipal divisions of the circuit courts, shall be
liens on the real estate of the person against
whom they are rendered, situate in the
county for which or in which the court is
held."26
New Section 511.350(2) provides that
judgments rendered in the associate divisions are not liens until they "are filed
with the clerk of the circuit court pursuant to sections 517.770 and 517.780,
RSMo." There are two possible constructions for this provision. The first

construction is that the statute extends
the trans~ripting requirements of Chapter 517 to all money judgments rendered in the associate division regardApr.-May 1983 - Journal of Missouri Bar - 195

less of whether such judgments stem
from cases within the scope of that
chapter.2 7 The second possible construction is that the statute continues
the prior practice of allowing judgments
to become liens in cases within the
scope of Chapter 517 but is silent as to
the effect of money judgments rendered
in other cases. The second construction,
read in conjunction with the "except"
clause of new Section 511.350(1), would
lead to the conclusion that judgments in
cases outside the scope of Chapter 517
cannot become
liens under any
28
circumstances.

ment debtor's real estate if the procedures of Sections 517.770 and 517.780
are followed.

Other problems with the
new legislation
There are other problems with the
new legislation. New Section 511.350(1)
specifically provides that judgments of
the circuit courts and probate divisions
are liens, and Section 511.360, which
has not been altered, states in part that
"Such liens shall commence on the day
of the rendition of the judgment ....
Without more, such judgments would
continue to be automatic liens, but new
Section 511.500, which is the heart of
the act, negates this result by providing
in part as follows:

One problem with the second construction is that Section 511.350(3) goes
on to make explicit what is implied by
the "except" clause of Section
511.350(1) with regard to judgments
rendered by small claims and municipal
divisions by providing that they "shall
not constitute liens against the real
estate of the person against whom they
are rendered." There is no similar provi- No judgment hereafter rendered by any
sion regarding associate division judg- court shall be a lien on real estate situate in
ments in cases outside the scope of such counties or city not within a county,
Chapter 517, and this gives rise to an until an abstract of said judgment shall be
implication that this class of cases was entered in a book to be kept by the clerk of
intended to come within the ambit of the circuit court having jurisdiction of civil
a county or a city not within a
Section 511.350(2). In fact, of course, causes within
...
the legislature may simply have over- county.
looked these cases in formulating the
This latter provision replaces the
statute. However, since transcripts prior statute providing for abstracting in
under Chapter 517 are not prepared as a populous cities and counties, and since
matter of course by the associate divi- the new statute does not contain populasion clerks but are available only upon tion limitations it apparently applies to
the request of the judgment creditors, the money judgments of all circuit
construing the statute in such a way as to courts and probate divisions within the
extend the transcripting requirement to state. This result is not absolutely clear
all cases heard in the associate division because the statute's use of the word
would not significantly increase the "such" to modify "counties or city not
clerks' obligations. Further, since such within a county" gives the impression
judgments will not become liens until that its impact is limited to certain counthe transcript is filed, extending the ties, but this impression is probably mistranscripting requirement should pre- leading. The statute in large measure
sent no problems for title examiners. tracks the language of the prior proviAccordingly, the first construction set sion limiting the abstracting requireout above may be preferable; and if it is ment to "such cities or counties" as qualadopted any money judgment rendered ified for coverage by population, and the
in the associate division, whether in a word "such" in the new statute is no
case governed by Chapter 517 or other- doubt vestigial. As a result, new Section
wise, will operate as a lien on the judg- 511.500 directly contradicts Section
196 - Journal of Missouri Bar - Apr.-May 1983

511.360. In this situation, the later of
the two repugnant statutes should be
enforced; and the quoted portion of Section 511.360 should be considered implicitly repealed. 9
,Another problem is that Section
511.360 also provides that judgment
liens continue for a period of three years
from the date the judgment is rendered
subject to revival, 3° but this provision
was enacted in conjunction with the
automatic lien provision which has now
been implicitly repealed. Presumably,
the implicit repeal only extends to those
portions of Section 511.360 that are inconsistent with the new legislation and
the three year limitation continues to be
applicable; but when does the three
years commence? Arguably, it still commences on the day the judgment is rendered; but such an interpretation is at
odds with the overall thrust of the new
scheme and should be rejected. A better
interpretation is that the provision for
the durational period has been amended
by implication to commence on the date
the lien commences, which is now the
date the abstract is entered. From the
point of view of the judgment creditor
who wants the lien extended beyond the
three years, the safe working presumption should be that the critical date is the
date the judgment was rendered, not

Contradictory provisions

created between old
scheme and new
legislation
the later date. There is another apparent
problem created by contradictory provisions between the old scheme and the
new legislation. Section 511.360,goes on
to state that "when two or more judgments or decrees are rendered at the
same term, as between the parties entitled to such judgments or decrees, the
lien shall commence on the last day of
-the term at which they are -rendered."
New Section 511.500, however, states

that "The liens of all judgments entered
in said book, as herein provided for,
shall have priority according to the
period of time of their respective entries
..
into said book....
These statements are not irreconcilable. The language of new Section
511.500, which tracks the prior statutory provision relating to practice in
populous cities and counties, should be
viewed as providing for the date of entry
as the priority date in contests between
a judgment lienor and such parties as
real estate mortgagees, fixture financers
and the bankruptcy trustee but as silent
on the issue of priorities between judgment lienors. -Under this construction,
Section 511.360 would still control
priorities between creditors with judgments rendered at the same term of
court,31 and under prior case law the
first party to levy execution would attain
priority. 2 Further, since new Section
511.500 retains much of the language of
its predecessor, it is logical to resolve
the issue by reference to cases interpreting priority rights in populous cities and
counties; and the cases hold that in such
areas there was no priority among judgments rendered at the same term. 3
This construction should now apply to
all money judgments rendered in any
circuit court or probate division during
the .same term.
The new legislation does not affect
.Section 511.510, and thus all clerks of
the probate divisions will have an
affirmative duty to furnish an abstract to
the appropriate circuit court clerk within five days of a judgment's rendition;
and all circuit court clerks will have an
affirmative duty to prepare and enter
abstracts ofjudgments rendered in their
own courts within five days. Section
511.510 contains language limiting its
impact to "such city or county" and before .the recent enactment that language
referred to populous cities and counties.
As with the similar language in new Section 511.500, use of the word "such" is
now irrelevant and should be ignored.
-On the whole, the new enactment is
salutary. By eliminating the automatic
Apr.-May 1983.-
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lien and extending the abstracting requirement, it should make it easier for
title examiners to locate liens. It also
takes care of the troubling possibility
that money judgments rendered in
municipal courts could be liens on real
estate. However, by dealing with only
two, of a series of interrelated statutes

Legislature created
unnecessary
ambiguities
the legislature created unnecessary
ambiguities. Section 511.360 should
have been amended to make it clear that
judgment liens no longer commence on
the day of rendition and that the three
year durational periods no longer commence on that date, and Section 511.500
should have deleted the word "such."
Section 511.510 should have been
amended to conform the duties of the
clerks more closely to the expanded
scope of Section 511.500; and new Section 511.350 should have dealt specifically with the problems created by
money judgments rendered in the
associate divisions in cases outside the
scope of Chapter 517. These problems
are, however, minimal; and they can be
resolved by a careful judicial interpretation of the new legislative scheme.
More troubling from a practical standpoint is the extension of the abstracting
requirement to the probate divisions. It
makes little sense to have an abstracting
scheme for probate division cases and a
parallel transcripting scheme for associate division cases. A better solution
would have been to apply the provisions
of Sections 517.770 and 517.780 to probate division judgments. By doing so,
the duties of the probate division clerks
would not have been increased but
judgment creditors would not have
been prejudiced since a transcript could
be obtained upon request. There is no
real reason for distinguishing between
associate division and probate division
judgments with respect to their capacity
198 - Journal of Missouri Bar - Apr.-May 1983

to become liens. Further legislation
adopting such a scheme could also clean
up the interpretive problems created by
the recent enactment.
E
FOOTNOTES
'Missouri case law limits the statutory
lien to judgments which are for a definite
sum and which are capable of being collected
by execution levied on the debtor's property. Kelly v. City of Cape Girardeau, 230 Mo.
App. 137, 89 S.W.2d 693 (1936); Taylor v.
Taylor, 367 S.W.2d 58 (Mo. App. 1963).
Accordingly, this article is limited to liens
created by money judgments, and the impact of other judgments and decrees on
rihts in real property is outside its scope.
S.B. 484, Missouri Laws 1982, p. -,
1982 Mo. Legis. Serv. 502. The act repeals
§§511.350 and 511.500, RSMo 1978, and replaces them with new sections bearing the
same numerical designations.
3 See also, Supreme Court Rule 74.34.
This rule will need to be amended in light of
the new legislation.
4 §476.010, RSMo 1969. This statute was
amended by the Court Reform and Revision
Act of 1978, H.B. 1634, Missouri Laws 1978,
p. 696. See, text accompanying fn. 21, infra.
5 §511.360, RSMo 1978; Supreme Court
Rule 74.35.
6 §511.500, RSMo 1978, repealed by S.B.
484, Missouri Laws 1982, p. -,
1982 Mo.
Legis. Serv. 502. The clerk's book was required to contain the names of the parties;
the date; the nature of the judgment or decree; the amount of the debt, damages and
costs; the book and page in which the judgment was entered; and a column for entering
the satisfaction or other disposition. Id.;
Supreme Court Rules 74.59-74.62.
The record keeping requirements are also
the subject of Supreme Court Administrative Rule 4, which became effective on
March 1, 1977. Administrative Rule 4.13
provides in part that "An alphabetical card
file index of all civil judgments shall be maintained, filed under the name of each party
against whom the judgment was rendered."
Administrative Rule 4.14 gives a standard
form for each card, but the form does not
provide for all the information required by
the statute and Rule 74.61. Thus, it is unclear whether the Administrative Rule supersedes or complements Rules 74.5974.62, which have not been repealed. The
recent legislation repealing and replacing
§511.500 retains the prior statutory language
requiring that the clerks maintain a book
containing the specified information. See
also, text accompanying fns. 23-25, infra.

7 §511.510, RSMo 1978.

8 Id;
9 Id.
10 §511.460 RSMo 1969, repealed by the
Court Reform and Revision Act of 1978,
H.B. 1634, Missouri Laws 1978, p. 696, §A.
The cognate Supreme Court Rule (74.73) has
yet to be repealed.
" Jurisdiction of the probate division
since the court reorganization is established
at §472.020, RSMo 1978.
12 Mo. Const., art. V, §27(2).
13 Mo. Const., art. V, §27(2) (a-d).
14 Mo. Const., art. V, §14.
15The jurisdiction of the associate circuit
judges is set out at §478.225, RSMo 1978.
The procedures set out in Chapter 517 apply
to most cases in which an associate circuit
judge is likely to render a money judgment,
specifically: all civil actions to recover money
where the sum demanded, exclusive of interest and costs, does not exceed $5,000
[§478.225(2)(1), RSMo 1978]; all actions
against railroad companies for the killing of
certain animals [§478.225(2)(2), RSMo

1978]; and all cases that could be decided by
a magistrate judge without assignment as an
acting circuit court judge under the law in
effect on January 1, 1979 [§478.225(2)(8),
RSMo 1978].
The provisions of Chapter 517 do not apply to cases heard by associate circuit judges in
the probate divisions [§517.010(1), RSMo
1978] or to other cases within the jurisdiction
of associate circuit judges as set out at
§478.225, RSMo 1978.
16 §517.770, RSMo 1978.
17 See, §§478.225 (3-7, 9) [jurisdiction of
associate circuit judges statewide];
478.225(3) [additional jurisdiction in the city
and county of St. Louis]. Most of the cases
described in these provisions will not result
in money judgments and the scope of the
problem is thereby reduced. See, fn. 28,

4.13.
' See, Cole, supra fn. 22, 37 J. Mo. Bar
320 325 (1981).
2d The author has not explored the ramifications of-the recent legislation as to conformity regarding liens of federal courts.
Missouri Title Examination Standard No.
21, 23 V.A.M.S. Ch. 442 (app.), should be
reviewed in light of the changes.
27 See, fns. 15 and 17, supra.
8 The cases in the associate division outside the scope of Chapter 517 that are the
most likely to result in money judgments are
such matters as uncontested dissolutions of
marriage, legal separation or -separate
maintenance proceedings. §448.225(3)(1),
RSMo 1978. These cases are within the jurisdiction of associate circuit judges in the city
and county of St. Louis but are not within the
statewide jurisdiction of associate circuit
judges.
In any case involving a judgment or order
to pay child support (whether in the associate
division or otherwise), another recent piece
of legislation specifically provides that such
judgment or order "shall not be a lien on the
real estate of the person against whom it is
rendered until such judgment or order is
filed in the judgment docket in the office of
the circuit clerk of any county in this state in
which such real estate is situated, and, upon
the request of the person entitled to receive
payments under the order, recorded in the
book kept for such purposes by the clerk
under section 511.450 or 511.500, RSMo."
S.B. 468, §24, Missouri Laws 1982 p. -,
1982 Mo. Legis. Serv. 938, §24. See also,
S.B. 468, §19, Missouri Laws 1982, p.-,
1982 Mo. Legis. Serv. 938, §19.
This lien of a properly docketed child support order extends for a period of ten years
from the time it is recorded, subject to a right
of revival for one additional ten year period.
Id 2 9 State ex rel. McNary v. Stussie, 518

infra.
'8 This result flows from the fact that the
associate division, as a division of the circuit
court, is a court of record. See, fns. 20-21,
infra.
'9§517.010(1), RSMo 1978.
20 Mo. Const., art. V, §27(2)(d).
21 §476.010, RSMo 1978.
22 See, Cole, Non-Indexed Judgment
Liens on Real Estate in Missouri, 37 J. Mo.
Bar 320 (1981).
23 Supreme Court Administrative Rule
4.01. See, fn. 6, supra.
24 Supreme Court Administrative Rule

S.W.2d 630 (1974).
30 See, §§511.370-511.430, RSMo 1978;
Supreme Court Rules 74.36-74.42.
, Circuit courts are in continual session,
but to the extent terms of court are still
specified by any statute they are deemed to
commence on the second Mondays in
February, May, August and November.
§478.250, RSMo 1978.
32 City of St. Louis v. Wall, 235 Mo. App.
9, 124 S.W.2d 616 (1939).
" Dunscomb v. Maddox, 21 Mo. 144
(1855); Bruce v. Vogel, 38 Mo. 100 (1866).
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